Assessing the political factors behind the progress in Turkey’s accession process into the European Union by Mandre, Maris
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor’s thesis 
Maris Mandre 
 
 
 
 
Assessing the political factors behind the progress in Turkey’s 
accession process into the European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Stefano Braghiroli, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 2016 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olen koostanud töö iseseisvalt. Kõik töö koostamisel kasutatud teiste autorite tööd, 
põhimõttelised seisukohad, kirjandusallikatest ja mujalt pärinevad andmed on viidatud. 
 
Olen nõus oma töö avaldamisega Tartu Ülikooli digitaalarhiivis DSpace. 
 
 
 
 
 
Maris Mandre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Table of Contents  
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………… 4 
1. Theoretical framework ……………………………………………………………... 7 
1.1 Framing the Europeanization of Turkey ……………………………………. 7 
1.2 Framing the political role of the member states through liberal 
intergovernmentalism ………………………………………………………….. 10 
1.3 European Union enlargement process ……………………………………... 12 
2. Methodology ………………………………………………………………………. 14 
2.1 Research design: operationalization, sources, timeline, and case selection .. 14 
3. Analysis ………………………………………………………………………….… 18 
3.1 Tracking ten years of Turkey’s progress between 2005 and 2015 ……….... 18 
3.2 Assessing the criteria behind opening, blocking, and closing of negotiating 
chapters ………………………………………………………………………… 23 
Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………… 26 
Resümee ……………………………………………………………………………… 27 
References ……………………………………………………………………………. 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Introduction 
Turkey is a strategic economic and geopolitical partner of the European Union (EU) and 
a growing economy on the border of Europe. It has an increasingly integrated 
relationship with the EU. Turkey is one of the five current European Union candidate 
countries. It has a long history of partnership with what was then the European 
Economic Community (EEC), before it became the European Union. In 1999, Turkey 
officially achieved a candidate country status. Having met the Copenhagen criteria in 
2004, it was decided that Turkey was ready to advance to the negotiation process the 
following year. The EU’s negotiation process implies advancement, cooperation, and 
alignment in various policy fields, which make up the 35 chapters in the EU’s 
legislation (acquis) that the candidate country has to adopt (European Commission). 
The negotiation process is an essential part of the accession of candidate states, thus is 
the main subject of analysis in this thesis. Now, over ten years later, it is important to 
look back and reflect on the process.  
In 2005, the European Commission (EC) expressed the open-ended perspective of the 
accession process:  
 The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an 
open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. 
While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if Turkey is not in a position to 
assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is 
fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond 
(European Commission 2005a).  
As Turkey started seeking association with the then EEC in 1959, it had in mind a 
prospect of full membership (Verney 2007:213). It has been a long road of adaptation 
and integration for Turkey, but not without setbacks. On the EU’s side, interest in the 
incorporation of Turkey has been uneven over time (Verney 2007:213-215). Turkey, on 
the other hand, has been looking towards Europe in all of its modern history (Aka & 
Gürsoy 2014:271). The Europeanization process of Turkey further accelerated with the 
candidate status. However, it is argued that since the beginning of negotiations until 
now, Turkey has actually been moving away from that direction – and even started de-
Europeanization (Yilmaz 2016:88-89). Some consider the diminishing enthusiasm a 
result of little progress made in the accession process (Yilmaz 2016:86).  
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Indeed, looking back on the 10 years of negotiations, the advancement of the process 
has perhaps not been as smooth as expected. Namely, out of the 33 chapters that are 
negotiable, 15 have been opened for negotiations, and only one of them provisionally 
closed; in addition, there are 14 more chapters that are currently blocked and suspended 
from being opened (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs). Thus, on the one 
hand, it is vital to track Turkey’s commitment to making progress and adapting the EU 
acquis. On the other hand, the role of other factors should be explored, as it is possible 
that Turkey’s level of adaptation is not the only aspect causing the stalling of 
negotiations.  
The candidate status and a possible accession of Turkey is a significant matter for the 
dynamics of Europe. As the European Union incorporates the interests of 28 member 
states, it is important to view it from an intergovernmental perspective. According to the 
theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, states are rational actors and the power in the 
EU is the result of the bargaining that takes place among them (Bulmer & Lequesne 
2013:8). Consequently, member states further their interests in the EU negotiations; 
moreover, essentially the same applies to the accession process of a candidate country. 
In fact, member governments have the capabilities to influence the enlargement process 
of the EU in every stage. Enlargement, however, tends to bring about certain challenges 
of diversity in the EU, which may affect how member states perceive a specific 
accession (Moravcsik 1998a:36-37). Therefore, the role of member states is an essential 
part in analyzing Turkey’s accession process, as well.  
Hence, this thesis focuses on criteria other than Turkey’s preparation that could possibly 
determine the progress of the accession. More precisely, this work analyzes Turkey’s 
progress in alignment with the acquis as part of the negotiation process; followed by the 
reviewing of the status of negotiations; and lastly, then, it is possible to determine the 
presence of other factors. Based on the theoretical background on the Europeanization 
of Turkey and the role of member states in the EU, it is expected that even in the case of 
Turkey’s sufficient progress in the negotiations, political factors stemming from other 
states pursuing their interests may be decisive in the process moving forward.  
The central research question of the thesis is, to what extent do the political factors 
affect the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU?  
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In addition, what precisely are the political issues stalling the accession process of 
Turkey? 
The present thesis is divided into three main sections. The theoretical portion of the 
work, first, focuses on the Europeanization literature to provide background on Turkey; 
second, introduces the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism and the two-level game to 
facilitate insight on member states’ role; and third, gives an overview of the EU’s 
enlargement process to make clear the requirements for accession. The second section is 
dedicated to methodology to lay out the rationale of present analysis, including the 
operationalization of variables, introduction of the sources, and the case selection. The 
third main section is devoted to the analysis of the selected cases: the tracking of 
Turkey’s progress in each field and the discovering of political factors that have 
influenced the negotiation process in each chapter.  
In order to achieve the present analysis, a quali-quantitative assessment is conducted on 
Turkey’s progress in the years 2005-2015, and on additional factors influencing the 
negotiations and the accession process as a whole. Valuable data originates from the 
European Commission’s yearly progress reports on Turkey, which give an objective 
assessment on Turkey’s alignment with the EU. The cases in the form of negotiable 
chapters are selected following the most similar systems design. The chapters that by 
2015 have reached a different status in the negotiations, despite a similar pattern in their 
progress, are in the central place for further analysis.   
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1. Theoretical framework  
Turkey’s relationship with the European Union (EU) over the past few decades has been 
an increasingly integrated one. The formal inception of Turkey’s adaptation process and 
the goal of EU membership dates back to the 1963 Association Agreement with the 
Union’s predecessor European Economic Community (EEC) (European Commission). 
In 1996, a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU was realized, which marks an 
important stage in the economic integration of the two (Aka & Gürsoy 2014:271). 
Previously, in 1987, Turkey had also applied for candidacy to join the European 
Economic Community, which was then rejected (European Commission). Over a 
decade later, Turkey was successful at the Helsinki summit in 1999, where it was 
granted candidate country status (European Commission). This step led Turkey to an 
intense adaptation period of carrying out reforms in the following years in order to meet 
the Copenhagen political criteria (Aka & Gürsoy 2014:272). At the Brussels summit in 
2004, it was agreed that Turkey had met the criteria sufficiently to start negotiations the 
following year (Aka & Gürsoy 2014:272). 
The starting of EU accession negotiations in 2005 marks the beginning of talks for 
Turkey’s full membership. It is a significant point in modern Turkey’s political and 
economic history, which is said to be “an attempt to catch up with, or adapt to, the 
developments in the rest of Europe” (Aka & Gürsoy 2014:271). Thus, in the following 
empirical analysis, this point of time is considered the beginning of the timeline in 
tracking Turkey’s progress in adaptation. However, Turkey’s ambitions in regards to the 
EU date further back and are more multifaceted than it appears by simply looking at the 
accession process. So, in order to provide background to Turkey’s progress in recent 
years, wider framing of the Europeanization of Turkey is essential in the theoretical 
portion of this work. In further theoretical analysis, the role of other states that are a part 
of the EU is viewed in relation to the accession process moving forward. For this 
reason, the second section of the theoretical framework concerns member states’ role 
viewed through the two-level game of liberal intergovernmentalism theory.  
1.1 Framing the Europeanization of Turkey 
Europeanization as a term has been defined in a variety of ways. Burak Erdenir argues 
that, in the case of Turkey, “the concepts of modernization, Westernization, and 
Europeanization have been used interchangeably to describe external influence on the 
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domestic transformation in Turkey” (Erdenir 2014:83). As Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun 
describe it, “the project of Westernization or modernization defined and justified 
reforms in the Turkish political, legal, and sociocultural system in order to reach the 
standards of higher civilization attained in other parts of the world, particularly since the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey” (Eralp & Torun 2013:25). 
However, in political analysis, Europeanization is referred to in the context of the EU. It 
concentrates on the domestic consequences brought about by the European integration 
process (Radaelli 2004:2). Noutcheva et al. define the concept of Europeanization as an 
analytical tool to “examine the changes in domestic structures and policies that occur in 
response to policies and practices institutionalized at the European level” (Noutcheva et 
al. 2004:20). Firat Cengiz and Lars Hoffmann (2013) explain it as “Europeanization 
encapsulates the transformation of domestic norms and structures under pressures 
emanating from the EU” (Cengiz & Hoffmann 2013:417). Whereas in the early 1990s 
Europeanization was used as a tool to analyze the EU member states’ transformation 
towards European integration, this concept has started to change (Alpan 2014:68). 
Europeanization as a concept evolved to also indicate the transformation in candidate 
states and even third countries (Alpan 2014:69).  
Johan Olsen identifies five usages of the term ‘Europeanization’: (1) based on changes 
in external boundaries, for example, the integration of new member states; (2) view of 
Europeanization as the development of institutions and central governance at the 
European level; (3) the classic usage of Europeanization viewed as ‘central penetration 
of national systems of governance’, that covers adjustment processes at the lower levels 
of the EU political system; (4) usage which describes exporting forms of political 
organization, for example the way the EU exports its values to non-member states 
through its foreign policy; (5) viewing Europeanization as ‘a political unification 
project’ at the EU level (Bulmer & Lequesne 2013:16-17). Here, it is possible to 
recognize Turkey in the third and fourth listed meanings of Europeanization. The third 
usage of Europeanization for example describes Turkey as a candidate and its alignment 
with the EU legislation; and in the sense of the fourth meaning, since Turkey is still not 
a member state, the EU also communicates with Turkey through its foreign policy.   
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Claudio M. Radaelli (2004:3) proposes the following definition on Europeanization: 
Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined 
and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public 
policies. 
The complexity of Europeanization is explained by Noutcheva et al. who bring out the 
characteristic of “interrelationships between the various layers constituting the 
European multi-level structure” (Noutcheva et al. 2004:21). There are two contrasting 
approaches to Europeanization; the top-down and the bottom-up. The former focuses on 
the pressure from Europe as an independent variable, as well as other intervening 
variables, which bring about reactions and change on the domestic level (Radaelli 
2004:4). The top-down process can be described as states ‘downloading’ norms, rules, 
and policies from the top: the EU level (Hang 2011:136). The bottom-up approach, on 
the other hand, starts from the level of domestic interactions: the actors, discourses and 
problems that are present on the domestic level (Radaelli 2004:4). This approach can be 
viewed as describing an ‘uploading’ process, “in which member states export or project 
their preferences to the EU level” (Hang 2011:136). In this case the state shapes 
policies, politics and institutions in the EU, to make them reflect its interests (Hang 
2011:141). Then, it is possible to view how the EU transforms, and how it changes 
matters on the domestic level, in return.  
Some argue that the top-down unidirectional view is not enough, and it should be 
combined with the bottom-up perspective. However, Turkey is not a member state and 
its bargaining power not sufficient, as it constantly tries to adapt to the EU ways in 
order to be eligible to join. In the case of Turkey, the bottom-up process is thus likely 
very minimal, and it is more important to look at the processes from the top-down 
perspective. Yet Europeanization is not a linear impact of the EU on the states: the 
definition by Radaelli implies that there can be ‘creative usages’ of Europe, and 
domestic actors have the opportunity to use Europe in different ways and create impacts 
discursively (Radaelli 2004:4).  
The importance of focusing on the domestic discourses on ‘Europe’ and perhaps the 
notion of ‘hegemony’ are brought up in the case of Turkey’s Europeanization, leading 
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to the concept of ‘Europe-as-hegemony’ (Alpan 2014:70). Başak Alpan focuses on two 
logics that brought about this understanding of ‘Europe-as-hegemony’ in Turkey: 
firstly, the inclusive and technocratic logic of apolitical ‘Europe’ that is ‘everybody’s 
project’; and secondly, the exclusive logic concerning the demonization of ‘the Other’ 
by polarizing the society. At the beginning of 2000’s, all of the governing parties in 
Turkey shared a consensual and apolitical connotation of Europe, despite their different 
political identities. This tone was also used by the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) that came to power in 2002. The European Union was found to be a national 
matter that would bring people together (Alpan 2014:74). 
1.2 Framing the political role of the member states through liberal 
intergovernmentalism 
In addition to a particular state’s progress in internalizing European values and rules, 
other member states also play a certain role in how the relationship and integration 
between the state and the EU evolves. Thus in analyzing the various potential factors 
influencing Turkey-EU negotiations, the position of member states has to be assessed. 
Andrew Moravcsik argues that European integration is best explained as “a series of 
rational choices made by national leaders” (Moravcsik 1998b:18). Moravcsik has come 
up with an approach called ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’ that is based on three ideas: 
 the state is a rational actor in Europe;  
 power in the EU is the result of bargaining amongst states;  
 and liberal theory is needed to explain the formation of national preferences 
within the state (Bulmer & Lequesne 2013:8).  
The third point in Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism theory focuses on national 
preferences which are “demands addressed by domestic societal actors to ‘their’ 
national government” (Bulmer & Lequesne 2013:8). This framework is inspired by the 
two-level game approach by Robert Putnam, which aims at understanding the role that 
member states’ governments play in the EU negotiations (Bulmer & Lequesne 2013:8-
9). Putnam’s approach strives to organize the dynamics of national and international 
politics simultaneously, and thus classifies the international level as level I, and 
domestic level as level II (Winn 2009:187). Putnam describes the game on the national 
level as domestic groups pursuing their interests by pressuring their government to 
adopt favorable policies. Politicians, on the other hand, seek power by forming 
11 
 
coalitions among those different interests (Putnam 1988:434). In return, on the 
international level, governments seek to satisfy domestic pressures as much as possible, 
while trying to minimize adverse consequences in international developments (Putnam 
1988:434). These two levels are interdependent and national governments are the 
central decision-makers (Putnam 1988:434). The government’s ability to maximize 
domestic interests and minimize adverse effects from the international level is 
symbolized by ‘win-sets’ that the two-level dynamic causes (Putnam 1988:435).  
However, this framework of bargaining that is generally applied to the policy 
negotiation process in the EU can be extended to the issue of enlargement, since the 
member states have to unanimously agree to accept any candidate state. There are 
numerous challenges to enlargement that member states can perceive differently. 
Moravcsik brings out three sets of challenges that Europe is facing in its integration 
process, namely, those of deepening, diversity, and democracy (Moravcsik 1998a:19). 
The challenge of diversity in particular is one that encompasses in itself problems 
relating to enlargement, thus these could be relevant in analyzing Turkey’s case. 
Moravcsik calls this issue ‘widening’, which means the EU’s geographical expansion 
and, in present case, includes the potential membership of Turkey (Moravcsik 
1998a:36).  
Widening brings about different effects that may cause issues within the EU. The 
clearest issues are the pressures of fragmentation emanating from the increased number 
and diversity of member states that have to coordinate their policies (Moravcsik 
1998a:37). This means that as a result of enlargement more interests have to be 
coordinated and there are more disagreements over policies. This, in turn, affects how 
efficient decision-making should work in the EU. The challenges that stem from 
diversity affect various fields. An important aspect is the candidate states’ readiness and 
fit for integration. For instance, diverse levels of political culture – development of 
regulatory structures, modernization, and monetary rigor –, as well as different trade 
patterns and economic success among countries result in misfit and difficulties 
integrating new members (Moravcsik 1998a:37-39). These problems put a significant 
financial strain on the EU due to the regional, structural, and agricultural subsidies that 
are required in order to integrate them (Moravcsik 1998a:39). 
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European governments have different interests in economic and geopolitical terms; 
there are some who profit from the EU enlargement to certain regions, and others that 
stay skeptical about their benefits (Moravcsik 1998a:38). The aforementioned issues 
thus cause conflicts within the Union. Challenges of diversity and the potential win-sets 
that each existing member state faces on the two-level game constitute the political 
factors that are subject to analysis in present work. The focus is on member 
governments, who, according to liberal intergovernmentalism and two-level theory, are 
central actors between the domestic and international levels and make rational choices 
in the EU.  
To facilitate insight in the present case of Turkey, member states and their impact is 
better observed in three groups, where states in each group share similar attitudes 
towards Turkey’s accession. This classification helps distinguish the variance of 
attitudes and political factors within the EU in further analysis. Therefore, the first 
group is made up by countries that are politically opposed to Turkey; the second group 
includes countries that over time show general skepticism towards Turkey’s accession; 
and lastly, the third group consists of countries that in principle are not against Turkey’s 
membership.  
1.3 European Union enlargement process 
The process of accession consists of three stages: (1) prospect of membership offered to 
the country; (2) official candidate status for membership; (3) formal membership 
negotiations (European Commission 2016). At the end of this process the candidate 
country can join the EU, granted that all member states agree (European Commission 
2016). In fact, existing member states’ approval is essential in every stage of the 
accession process (European Commission 2016). Before the candidate can move on to 
the negotiation process, it must fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, which consist of 
political, economic, and legal requirements (European Commission 2015a:5). This 
means the candidate country must have stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights; in economic terms it must be a functioning and 
competitive market economy; it must adhere to the laws and practices of the EU, 
including the obligations of political, economic, and monetary union (European 
Commission 2015a:5). It was decided that Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria in 2004, 
and the following year the EU proceeded to open negotiations with Turkey.  
13 
 
The negotiation process concerns the ability of a candidate to follow the obligations of 
the EU membership (European Commission 2015a:7). The acquis itself, organized in 
the form of 35 chapters, is not negotiable (European Commission 2015a:7). The 
chapters each correspond to a policy area of the EU law (European Commission 
2015a:7). In fact, the negotiations between the EU and the candidate take place in order 
to agree on how and when the candidate will effectively implement the acquis 
(European Commission 2015a:7). The process starts with screening, which involves 
introducing the acquis to the candidate and identifies the candidate’s level of alignment 
in different areas; followed by the Commission’s screening report to the Council with 
suggestions for opening a chapter or setting requirements – opening benchmarks – that 
must first be met (European Commission 2015a:7). On the basis of the Commission’s 
assessment in the report, the member states decide when the opening benchmarks in a 
field are met and the candidate can submit its negotiating position (European 
Commission 2015a:8). The Council acting from a common position of the EU, then, 
allows the opening of negotiations and states the closing benchmarks to be met for the 
chapter (European Commission 2015a:8). Once the candidate country has progressed 
enough and met those benchmarks, the member states can provisionally close the 
chapter (European Commission 2015a:8). Throughout the whole negotiation process, 
the Commission monitors and reports the candidate state’s commitments and progress 
(European Commission 2015a:8). Following the completion of all negotiations, the 
accession treaty can be formed (European Commission 2015a:8). There are a few 
important things to note that apply to the entire negotiation process. First, the EU’s 
positions are based on member states’ unanimous decisions; and secondly, the European 
Commission’s reports are the basis of all decisions regarding the status of negotiations.  
The EU’s negotiation process implies advancement, cooperation, and alignment in 
various policy fields which make up the 35 chapters in the EU’s acquis that the 
candidate country has to adopt (European Commission). The advancement of 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU has perhaps not been as smooth as some 
observers might have expected (European Commission 2005b, 2006-2014, 2015b). Out 
of the 33 chapters that are negotiable, 15 have been opened for negotiations, and only 
one of them provisionally closed; in addition, there are 14 more that are currently 
blocked and suspended from being opened (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU 
Affairs). 
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2. Methodology  
The following analysis is a quali-quantitative assessment of the discourse of Turkey’s 
negotiation progress. This thesis seeks to explore the extent to which political factors 
have influenced the progress of the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU, 
which is generally defined as a merely technocratic and objective process. European 
Commission releases annual reports on Turkey, which track the country’s progress in 
the negotiable chapters of the EU acquis. The progress report objectively reflects 
Turkey’s level of alignment with the European Union law. In this work’s context, then, 
the reports composed every year are a tool to follow Turkey’s Europeanization. In 
contrast, European Union is made up of states with their own attitudes concerning 
different topics, as they seek to forward their own interests. Therefore, it is expected 
that member states’ attitudes play a certain role in the accession process of Turkey, as 
well. Based on the theoretical framework, it is expected that member states’ role in the 
negotiation process between the EU and Turkey may influence the stalling of progress. 
The central research question of the thesis is, to what extent do the political factors 
affect the negotiation process between Turkey and the EU?  
In addition, what precisely are the political issues stalling the accession process of 
Turkey? 
In the empirical part of the paper, first, Turkey’s progress is assessed in selected cases 
by conducting a comparative analysis using the most similar system design, followed by 
a discussion on the results. The second section in this analysis discusses the criteria 
behind opening, closing, and blocking of chapters and summarizes the role of political 
factors in the negotiation process. In this chapter, the means for conducting current 
study – the rationale of the analysis, timeline, and cases are introduced.  
2.1 Research design: operationalization, sources, timeline, and case 
selection 
The EC’s annual reports serve as the main source to track Turkey’s alignment with the 
EU in different policy fields over time. Updated information is available on the status of 
the negotiations in all fields, which shows the chapters that have been opened and those 
that have been suspended by the EU or vetoed by member states. As a result, it will be 
possible to see, on the one hand, if in some cases the progress has been good and 
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Turkey is advanced at a sufficiently high level, yet chapter has remained closed due to 
blockages and the political reasons involved; on the other hand, how Turkey has 
progressed in different fields despite blockages. Based on these findings, the political 
factors will be further elaborated on using the available literature. 
The negotiation process for Turkey’s accession started in 2005 between Turkey and the 
EU. The European Commission has since released annual reports on Turkey’s progress. 
The progress assessment is based on the 33 chapters that are composed of different 
fields where a candidate state is required to align with the EU acquis. Therefore, the 
timeline for the present analysis runs from 2005 to 2015, the sources being the reports 
on Turkey for each year. Each report contains an overview of Turkey’s general progress 
and, most importantly, the “ability to take on the obligations of membership” 
concerning the 33 chapters (European Commission 2015a:7). The progress report is 
thus an objective assessment of Turkey’s advancement and level of alignment with the 
EU.  
Cases for the following work are chosen among the 33 chapters. Research is conducted 
in a small-N method, following the logic of most similar system design. Chapters are 
analyzed to see if despite otherwise similar progress and level of alignment with the 
acquis, there exists variance in chapters’ status in 2015. The idea is that in the case of a 
visible improvement, the chapter should be opened. If chapters with substantial 
developments have been blocked, the assessment criteria’s objectivity can be doubted, 
and there is likely a presence of other, political factors. Then, it is possible to compare 
the assessment of Turkey’s progress in chapters that have been opened and those that 
have not been opened. In other words, see if it has objectively made sense to open the 
chapters that have been opened, while others have remained closed. This work seeks to 
discover the reasons behind opening and not opening of negotiation chapters, and learn 
whether and to what extent political reasons stall negotiations. Therefore, the cases are 
selected among chapters that have followed a similar pattern in progress reports, yet 
have a different status by 2015. More precisely, three cases are chosen among chapters 
that are open to negotiations, and another three among chapters that have not been 
opened. Therefore, data will be collected from a total sample of six chapters. 
The coding process of EC’s progress reports for collecting data is conducted as follows: 
 A chapter’s starting point in 2005 will be retrieved, as stated in the report 
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 For each following year, the progress in every field is given a score:  
 a positive score (+) is given when assessment has been mostly positive;  
 a negative score (-) follows a mostly negative assessment;  
 a neutral score (=) implies that substantial progress is lacking or there is 
an equal share of positive and negative developments. 
The sample chapters are selected and progress analyzed in the following process: 
 Retrieving relevant information on the 33 chapters from the EC’s annual 
progress reports 
 Evaluation of the assessment of Turkey’s progress in each field over time 
 Giving a score in each field for progress each year; the score can be positive (+), 
negative (-), neutral (=) 
 Selecting out chapters that by 2015 have reached a ‘good level of preparation’1, 
which should imply the opening of the chapter 
 Following most similar system design, chapters with similar patterns are 
selected – chapters that in 2005 had a starting point of an ‘advanced’ level of 
alignment with the acquis  
 Final criteria for selecting chapters for further analysis: (a) 3 chapters that are 
open; (b) 3 chapters that are not open 
 Comparison of the sample chapters’ progress and final status in 2015. 
 
The application of most similar system design (MSSD) in the present analysis 
encompasses cases – selected chapters – which in 2005-2015 make progress in a similar 
pattern, yet result in a different status by 2015. The MSSD is used to analyze cases that 
share common features (progress), yet in the presence of a key explanatory factor 
(political factors) among some cases, result in a different outcome (opening or non-
opening of chapters) (Landman 2008:70).  
 
Following the abovementioned sampling process, the chapters chosen for further 
analysis are: 
7 – Intellectual property law 
20 – Enterprise and industrial policy  
                                                          
1 EC’s wording in their assessment of Turkey’s progress, here and hereafter 
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26 – Education and culture 
29 – Customs union 
30 – External relations 
32 – Financial control 
What ensues in the next section of this paper is data analysis and discussion of progress 
in each field, followed by an assessment of decisive criteria other than progress, which 
affects the (non-)opening of negotiating chapters. 
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3. Analysis 
In present analysis, six chapters from EC’s annual progress reports on Turkey in the 
years 2005-2015 are assessed. Selected chapters are above average in their level of 
alignment with the acquis compared to the rest of the 33 chapters. Turkey’s starting 
point in all six fields was at least ‘advanced’, or ‘well advanced’ in the case of chapters 
7 and 29. By 2015, all six chapters reached a ‘good level of preparation’. Chapters 7, 
20, and 32 are open to negotiations, while chapters 26, 29, and 30 remain closed due to 
blockages. The progress of these six fields is viewed in the first section of the current 
chapter, with special focus on the chapters that have not been opened. The second 
section focuses on the factors that prevent them from being opened, and finishes with a 
discussion on the stalling of the negotiation process. 
3.1 Tracking ten years of Turkey’s progress between 2005 and 2015 
Reflecting Turkey’s progress in selected fields, figure 1 (based on table 1) contains 
abovementioned positive/negative/neutral (+)/(-)/(=) score assessment.  Here, the value 
of the line increases with a positive score, and stays the same with a neutral score. No 
negative scores were recorded among the six selected chapters in the years 2005-2015. 
An important aspect to note is that the increase in every field and year is not 
proportional. The graph illustrates the pattern of change versus no change, but it should 
not be implied that the degree of change in every case is equal.  
Figure 1. Patterns in selected chapters’ progress 2005-2015  
 
Source: compiled by the author; data from European Commission 2005-2015 Progress Reports 
on Turkey 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
7 Intellectual
property law
20 Enterprise and
industrial policy
26 Education and
culture
29 Customs union
30 External
relations
32 Financial control
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Chapters 7 – Intellectual property law, 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy, and 32 – 
Financial control – are the three chapters open to negotiations (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of EU Affairs). Chapters 26 – Education and culture, 29 – Customs union, and 
30 – External relations – have not been opened. Despite their good progress compared 
to other chapters, they remain closed due to obstacles preventing them from being 
opened. Namely, chapter 26 has a blockage from Cyprus, and chapters 29 and 30 are 
suspended by the EU Council (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs).  
Table 1. Turkey’s progress in selected chapters over the course of the negotiation 
process  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Status in 
2015 
7 + + + + + + = + + + + Open 
20 + + + + + + + + + + + Open 
26 + + + + + + + + + + + Blocked 
29 + + = + + + = + + = = Suspended 
30 + + = + = + = = + = + Suspended 
32 + + = + = = + + + + + Open  
Source: compiled by the author; data from European Commission 2005-2015 Progress Reports 
on Turkey 
Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law 
The chapter on intellectual property law was opened 17 June 2008 (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of EU Affairs). According to European Commission, this chapter concerns the 
“harmonised rules for the legal protection of copyright and related rights. This covers, 
for instance, computer programs, broadcasting and trademarks, designs, 
biotechnological inventions and pharmaceuticals” (European Commission 2015b:40). 
At the beginning of the negotiation process, Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis was 
already well advanced in this field. Reports from most years reflect ‘some’ or ‘good’ 
progress. In 2011, the progress in the field of intellectual property law was ‘limited’. 
Considering the starting point of a high level of alignment and further progress in the 
following years, it can be said that the opening of chapter 7 in 2008 was a logical 
decision. According to the EC’s report, some shortcomings still remain in 2015. For 
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example, widespread counterfeiting and piracy are still issues that Turkey needs to 
improve its enforcement measures against. Turkey is also expected to adopt pending 
legislation on industrial property and copyright (European Commission 2015b:40). 
There is no visible sign of the parties’ readiness to close this chapter yet.  
Chapter 20 – Enterprise and industrial policy  
Present chapter was opened to negotiations 29 March 2007 (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of EU Affairs). The European Commission describes this chapter by stating 
that “EU industrial policy enhances competitiveness, facilitates structural change and 
encourages an enterprise friendly environment that stimulates small and medium sized 
enterprises” (European Commission 2015b:53).  
The chapter of enterprise and industrial policy started at an advanced level in 2005. The 
progress reports reflect continuous progress over the negotiation process. However, the 
EC report from 2015 still suggests improvements in policy compliance, as there are 
restrictive instruments that are not in line with the EU principles (European 
Commission 2015b:53). Overall, Turkey has achieved a good level of preparation in 
this field. The opening of negotiations in 2007 seemed appropriate considering the 
advanced level of alignment. Despite the continuing progress in this field, Turkey has 
not been successful in provisionally closing the negotiation chapter after eight years. 
The Commission has confirmed that Turkey has undertaken the necessary closing 
benchmark for this chapter (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs). In fact, the 
present chapter is technically ready to be closed, but this is where the Additional 
Protocol comes in (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs). The Additional 
Protocol is to be assessed in the discussion part in section 3.2.  
Chapter 26 – Education and culture 
The chapter on education and culture was blocked by Cyprus in December 2009 
(Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). According to the European 
Commission, this chapter encompasses “cooperation in education and culture through 
funding programmes and through the open method of coordination. Member States 
must also prevent discrimination and facilitate education of children of EU migrant 
workers” (European Commission 2015b:75).  
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In this chapter, Turkey started at an advanced level of alignment and has continued to 
make further progress every year. Turkey is still expected to improve the quality of 
education and increase participation at all levels of education, as well as ratify the 
UNESCO Convention (European Commission 2015b:75). The chapter is not open to 
negotiations, as it is subject to political blockage from Cyprus since 2009. Otherwise, 
following the progress that Turkey has made and compared to other open chapters, the 
chapter of education and culture could be open by now. In addition, Turkey has 
submitted its Negotiation Position Document to the EU, but an opening benchmark is 
not foreseen (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs). Thus, this is a case of a field 
that is sufficiently advanced, but there is a political blockage that prevents it from being 
opened. On the other hand, it is visible that Turkey has continued to make progress in 
this field despite the blockage. In addition, one could point out that education and 
culture does not seem to be a field that should be affected by political factors from the 
international level. Further reasons are discussed in the next part of the paper, in section 
3.2.   
Chapter 29 – Customs union 
The present chapter was suspended with the EU Council’s decision 11 December 2006 
(Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs). The Commission states that “all Member 
States are part of the EU customs union and follow the same customs rules and 
procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementing and 
enforcement capacity and access to the common computerised customs systems” 
(European Commission 2015b:79). 
At the beginning of the negotiations, Turkey was already at a high level of advancement 
in the field of customs union. This is due to the framework of the EC-Turkey Customs 
Union, where Turkey’s alignment with the EU is high (European Commission 
2005b:125). The reason why Turkey does not make further progress every year in the 
reported period, is exactly because Turkey is already well prepared. Nonetheless, some 
shortcomings remain. For instance, there are still import and export restrictions and 
conflicting measures that violate the Customs Union (European Commission 2015b:79). 
Questions arise, then, as to why negotiations in this chapter cannot be opened, despite 
the EU-Turkey Customs Union since 1996. However, chapter 29 is suspended by the 
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EU Council with reference to the Additional Protocol, which are discussed in section 
3.2.  
Chapter 30 – External relations 
This chapter was suspended by the EU Council 11 December 2006 (Republic of 
Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs). The chapter is described by the European 
Commission: “EU has a common trade and commercial policy towards third countries, 
based on multilateral and bilateral agreements and autonomous measures. There are also 
EU rules in the field of humanitarian aid and development policy” (European 
Commission 2015b:80). 
In the chapter of external relations Turkey’s starting point was relatively advanced 
mostly thanks to alignment in Customs Union, as with the previous chapter. During the 
whole reporting period, Turkey’s progress has been mostly good, but some years the 
change has either been limited, or there have been small setbacks. As Turkey’s 
alignment in the field of customs union has been good from the beginning, it has also 
continued to increase development aid for the fields of development policy and 
humanitarian aid (European Commission 2015b:81). Turkey’s shortcomings in this field 
arise from its deviation from the Customs Union, as with the previous chapter 
(European Commission 2015b:80). Viewing Turkey’s level of alignment in the field of 
external relations, it may seem logical to open it to negotiations. However, it is also 
suspended by the EU Council due to the Additional Protocol. Keeping that in mind, the 
discussion on the Additional Protocol follows in section 3.2.  
Chapter 32 – Financial control 
Negotiations on the present chapter were opened 26 June 2007 (Republic of Turkey, 
Ministry of EU Affairs). The Commission describes the essence of this chapter: “based 
on international standards, EU financial control rules promote sound financial 
management of national income and expenditure. They also protect the EU's financial 
interests against fraud in the management of EU funds and the euro against 
counterfeiting” (European Commission 2015b:83).   
Turkey started at a good level in the field of financial control and has been making some 
progress most years since then. The Commission report states that further efforts are 
still needed on Turkey’s part; for instance, in implementing public internal financial 
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control (European Commission 2015b:83). Overall, Turkey’s level of preparation is 
good. The chapter was opened to negotiations already in 2007. In addition, the 
Commission has confirmed that Turkey has undertaken the closing benchmark of this 
chapter (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs). However, it still has not been 
provisionally closed. 
3.2 Assessing the criteria behind opening, blocking, and closing of 
negotiating chapters 
As is evident from the last section of this work, the opening and closing of negotiating 
chapters does not follow the simple logic of progress. In fact, most, or even all chapters 
assessed in present work are affected by other factors. The extent of and the exact 
reasoning behind other criteria affecting the negotiation process in each case differs. As 
a matter of fact, political factors play a decisive role in the advancement of the 
negotiations. In other words, these factors prevent the opening of certain chapters, as 
became evident earlier, and also the closing of chapters. This is discussed in the present 
section. 
Chapters 29 and 30 are suspended by the EU Council since 2006. This reasoning dates 
back to the early days of relations between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey. Namely, in 1963 Turkey and the EEC signed the Association Agreement, also 
known as the Ankara Agreement, with a clear objective of completing a customs union 
between the two, with a possible perspective of Turkey’s membership (Serdaroğlu: 
2014). The transitional stage of this agreement began with the Additional Protocol in 
1970, which laid out reciprocal obligations between the two parties to achieve the 
customs union (Aral 2005:100). As the customs union was realized in the 1990s and 
Turkey was taking steps towards candidacy and then membership, Cyprus joined the 
EU in 2004. However, Turkey had ceased to recognize the Republic of Cyprus in 1963 
(Talmon 2006:583). In the absence of diplomatic relationships between the two, Turkey 
denied signing the Additional Protocol to extend the customs union to the Republic of 
Cyprus, as this would essentially imply the recognition of Cyprus (Talmon 2006:583).  
Despite eventually signing the Additional Protocol, Turkey did not follow the full 
implementation of it (Talmon 2006:608). As the restrictions on means of transport with 
regard to Cyprus were not lifted, Turkey thus acted against the free movement of goods 
and people (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey). Therefore, in December 
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2006, the EU Council suspended eight chapters that are relevant to Turkey’s restrictions 
(Delegation of the European Union to Turkey). In the context of making this fragile 
decision, the EU Council opted to blocking these chapters to find a resolution to 
continue the accession negotiations, as otherwise there was a possibility that Cyprus 
would place its veto on the negotiations. Among the chapters suspended by the EU 
Council are also chapter 29 and chapter 30, concerning customs union and external 
relations, respectively. Hence, Turkey has not been able to open negotiations in these 
fields, and according to the EU Council’s decision, will not be able to until it 
implements the Additional Protocol to all member states. 
The clearest sign of political factors concerns chapter 26 – Education and culture. As 
chapter 26 is subject to a unilateral political blockage by the Republic of Cyprus, this is 
a result of the complicated relations between neighboring states. Namely, chapter 26 is 
one of six that Cyprus vetoed in 2009. Since a unanimous approval of member states is 
essential in opening or closing any chapters, Cyprus has the veto right and the 
possibility to block negotiations in different chapters. In fact, Dutch foreign minister 
Bernard Bot once stressed “the ‘intergovernmental’ nature of Turkey talks”, meaning it 
is the member states, and not the Commission, who Turkey is negotiating with 
(Beunderman 2006). As a matter of fact, the prospect of the Cyprus’ veto on Turkey’s 
accession negotiations was relevant even before 2009, as the EU was aware of the 
possibility in its decision in 2006 (Beunderman 2006). As chapter 26 on education and 
culture in principle does not seem to be a sensitive issue, specific reasons for Cyprus’ 
response to this chapter among others seems unclear. Thus the long-term conflict 
between the two countries, and the restrictions that Turkey continued to maintain on 
Cyprus in the field of transportation, resulted in Cyprus’ response.  
Furthermore, the EU Council’s decision in 2006 did not just concern the opening of 
certain chapters. In fact, it was then decided that under these circumstances, no chapter 
could be provisionally closed (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey). In other 
words, Turkey has to fulfil its commitments it took on with the Additional Protocol and 
lift restrictions that violate it. So, despite having undertaken the closing benchmarks to 
chapters 20 and 32; the former of them technically ready to be closed, shortcomings 
stemming from Turkey not fully following the Additional Protocol do not allow the 
provisional closing of any chapter (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of EU Affairs).  
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Turkey had only opened and provisionally closed one chapter in 2006 prior to the EU 
suspension. In general, the EU Council’s decision has caused the stalling of negotiations 
in the sense that, despite Turkey making further progress in different areas, no 
agreements on closing more chapters can be reached. Whereas enlargement in principle 
is seen as an objective, technocratic process, based on a technical assessment of a 
candidate, it is visible that in the case of Turkey’s accession process, it is not so. In 
Turkey’s accession process there are strong political factors that influence the progress 
of negotiations.  
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Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to explore the extent to which political factors have 
influenced Turkey’s accession process into the European Union. The thesis first 
discussed the Europeanization literature to frame Turkey’s integration with the EU. The 
theoretical basis for the role of the EU member states was then framed through the two-
level game and the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. The theoretical framework 
implied that the member states are central actors in the EU, as they forward their 
rational interests between the domestic and international levels. Furthermore, member 
states’ central role in the enlargement process is also apparent, as the condition of 
unanimity of all of the EU decisions reflects.  
The negotiation process between the EU and Turkey as the main part of the accession 
was the central subject of the present analysis. The first, essential part of the analysis 
sought to track Turkey’s progress based on the European Commission’s annual progress 
reports on Turkey in the years 2005-2015. Turkey’s progress in alignment with the EU 
acquis in the 33 chapters was measured using quali-quantitative methods; and the cases 
used for further analysis were selected following the logic of most similar system 
design. The resulting selection of chapters were found to share a similar pattern in their 
progression as they were all well advanced. However, the chapters differed in the status 
that they had achieved by 2015. 
Continuing with the analysis, it appeared that the negotiations have essentially reached a 
deadlock. Namely, three of the analyzed chapters were subject to a blockage from a 
member state or suspended by the EU Council, thus could not be opened to negotiations 
for political reasons. Somewhat surprisingly, political factors also affected chapters that 
were open and technically advanced enough to be provisionally closed. The stalling of 
negotiations based on the chapters assessed in the present work, in one way or another, 
stems from the ‘Cyprus question’. The key finding in this work was that the capabilities 
of the member states to influence the process may be essential in the EU enlargement, 
as is the case with Turkey’s membership application. Therefore, even with Turkey’s 
continuing progress in the negotiation areas, it is clear that there is a presence of strong 
political factors which determine the limited rate of the accession process.  
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Resümee 
Poliitiliste tegurite hindamine Türgi Euroopa Liitu vastuvõtuprotsessi edenemise juures  
Maris Mandre 
Käesolev bakalaureusetöö uuris Türgi edenemist Euroopa Liidu (EL) 
sisseastumisprotsessi kontekstis. Töö fookus oli suunatud Türgi arengule 
läbirääkimisvaldkondades, et välja selgitada objektiivse arengu vastavus 
vastuvõtuprotsessi kulgemisega tegelikkuses. Nimelt, töö eesmärk oli välja selgitada 
poliitiliste tegurite roll Türgi-EL läbirääkimistes. Eesmärgi saavutamiseks sõnastati 
järgnevad uurimisküsimused: mil määral mõjutavad poliitilised tegurid Türgi ja 
Euroopa Liidu vahelisi läbirääkimisi? Millised täpselt on need poliitilised küsimused, 
mis aeglustavad Türgi liitumisprotsessi?  
Türgi ja EL partnerlus ulatub tagasi 1950. aastate lõppu, millest järgnevatel 
aastakümnetel jätkas Türgi taotlustega Euroopa Liidule läheneda, pidades silmas 
eesmärki lõpptulemusena saavutada liikmelisus. 1999. aastal sai Türgist ametlikult 
kandidaatriik ning 2005. aastal alustati läbirääkimistega, mis hõlmavad endas Türgi-
poolset ELi õigustiku omaksvõtmise arutamist. Enam kui kümme aastat hiljem, ja 
läbirääkimised ei ole sisuliselt kaugele arenenud. Vaid üks peatükk 33st läbirääkimistel 
käsitletavast on siiani arutatud ja provisoorselt kinni pandud. Seega selle töö huvides oli 
välja selgitada põhjused, mis läbirääkimiste kulgu venitavad.  
Kuna antud bakalaureusetöö eeldus oli, et läbirääkimised venivad mitte ainult Türgi 
konkreetsest arengust ELi seadustiku rakendamise osas tulenevatest põhjustest, siis 
võeti lisaks käsitluse alla liikmesriigid, kellel on oluline roll protsessi juhtimisel. Seega 
töö teoreetilise raamistikuga loodi alus edasiseks analüüsiks ühest küljest Türgi 
euroopastumise protsessist; teisalt liikmesriikide rollist vaadatuna läbi liberaalse 
valitsustevahelisuse ja kahe mängutaseme teooria. Nimelt sellest vaatenurgast on riigid 
Euroopas ratsionaalsed tegutsejad, kes nii rahvusvahelisel kui rahvuslikul tasandil 
edendavad optimaalselt enda huve.  
Analüüs teostati kasutades esmalt Euroopa Komisjoni poolt iga-aastaselt väljaantavat 
aruannet Türgi progressi kohta, mille seast koostati valim peatükkidest, mis vastaks 
kõige sarnasemate juhtumite meetodile. Uurimise all olid peatükid EL seadustikust, 
milles Türgi oli heal tasemel edenenud. Nende seast oli võimalik eristada peatükke, mis 
olid läbirääkimisteks avatud ja neid, mida polnud võimalik avada blokeeringu tõttu.  
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Seega oli ilmne, et Türgi-EL läbirääkimistes käsitletavate peatükkide avamine 
aruteludeks ei järgi vaid Türgi tehnilist valmisolekut. Samuti jõuti järelduseni, et ka 
valmisolek teatud valdkondades arutelude provisoorseks lõpetamiseks ei olnud piisav 
läbirääkimiste edendamiseks. Nimelt, Türgi-EL läbirääkimised on hetkel seisus, kus 
teatud peatükke on võimalik veel aruteludeks avada, kui Türgi selleks valmis on ja 
puudub blokeering. Ent ühegi peatüki provisoorne sulgemine pole võimalik; ning 14 
peatüki avamine on peatatud.  
Niisiis on praegune olukord ummikseis, kus Türgi võib tehniliselt oma valmisolekut 
edendada, kuid reaalseid muutusi läbirääkimistes ei ole ette näha. Põhjused, mis 
peituvad peatükkide peatamise taga, on aga poliitiliste tegurite tulemus. Nendest 
mõningate blokeeringu taga seisab Küpros, kes kasutas sel puhul oma vetoõigust. 
Euroopa Ülemkogu otsus peatada osade peatükkide avamine ning välistada ühegi 
peatüki provisoorne sulgemine tulenes tegelikult ka just Türgi ’Küprose probleemist’. 
Türgi ei tunnista Küprose Vabariiki, mistõttu on kehtestanud piiravad meetmed ühe EL 
liikmesriigi vastu. Lõpptulemusena on selge, et 10 aastat kestnud sisuline paigalseis 
Türgi ja Euroopa Liidu läbirääkimistes ei näe lõppu enne, kui suhted vastavas 
naabruskonnas on muutunud ja poliitilised blokeeringud vabastatud. Euroopa Liidu 
laienemist üldistades on aga võimalik väita, et selle kulgemine ei ole alati tingimata 
puhtalt apoliitiline protsess, mille näiteks on ka Türgi juhtum.  
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